



Hanifi Baris                        ATÂTÔT | Anápolis, v. 1, n. 2, p. 7-24, jul./dez., 2020. 
7 
 
Competing Visions of Political Community in the Middle East: the Kurdish 
Model as an Alternative to Theocracy and Nationalism 
 
Visões Conflitantes da Comunidade Política no Oriente Médio: o Modelo 
Curdo como uma Alternativa à Teocracia e ao Nacionalismo 
 
Hanifi Baris 
(PhD, Leverhulme Early Career Fellow, CISRUL/University of Aberdeen, UK) 
E-mail: hanifi.baris@abdn.ac.uk  
 
Abstract  
Democratic Confederalism, the model of political community developed by the dominant Kurdish political movements in 
Northern and Western Kurdistan (Turkey and Syria), is not only a model for the recognition of Kurdish national rights, 
autonomy or self-government. It is but an ambitious and comprehensive model of political community that has become a 
competitor to the three dominant visions of political community in the Middle East, namely nationalism, Islamism and 
(neo)Ottomanism. The model is designed to primarily tackle political domination, although it also addresses social and gender 
inequality, economic exploitation, environmental degradation and climate change. It therefore gets into direct confrontation 
with the existing political establishments in Turkey and Syria in particular and in the Middle East in general. Additionally, 
since the Kurdish political movement tries to realise its program without authorization from nation-states, their agenda and 
praxis are not tolerated by established orders and confronted violently in the region. Their program is perceived as a threat to 
the national security of the states involved. Hence, I argue, it is ultimately up to a Kurdish act of foundation whether the model 
will survive the current hostility and emerge either victorious or as an alternative to the existing models.  
Keywords: Democratic Confederalism; Radical Democracy; Pan-Islamism; Rojava Revolution, Kurdish Autonomy. 
Sumário  
O Confederalismo Democrático, o modelo de comunidade política desenvolvido pelos movimentos políticos curdos 
dominantes no Norte e no Oeste do Curdistão (Turquia e Síria), não é apenas um modelo para o reconhecimento dos direitos 
nacionais curdos, autonomia ou autogoverno. É apenas um modelo ambicioso e abrangente de comunidade política que se 
tornou um concorrente das três visões dominantes da comunidade política no Oriente Médio, a saber, nacionalismo, Islamismo 
e (neo)Otomanismo. O modelo é projetado principalmente para lidar com a dominação política, embora também trate da 
desigualdade social e de gênero, exploração econômica, degradação ambiental e mudança climática. Portanto, entra em 
confronto direto com as instituições políticas existentes na Turquia e na Síria em particular e no Oriente Médio em geral. Além 
disso, como o movimento político curdo tenta realizar seu programa sem a autorização dos Estados-nação, sua agenda e práxis 
não são toleradas por ordens estabelecidas e são confrontadas violentamente na região. Seu programa é visto como uma ameaça 
à segurança nacional dos Estados envolvidos. Portanto, eu argumento, em última análise, depende de um ato curdo de fundação 
se o modelo sobreviverá à hostilidade atual e emergirá ou vitorioso ou como uma alternativa aos modelos existentes. 
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 “We left Ankara [and] became a party, we arrived at the Middle East [and] became 
an army, we will achieve statehood through opening up to the world”2 was a widely quoted 
maxim of Abdullah Ocalan (Serxwebûn 1998, 2)3, the imprisoned leader of the PKK4 (Partiya 
Karkerên Kurdistanê-Kurdistan Workers’ Party). This maxim was quoted three times in the 
party’s official periodical Serxwebûn in November 1998 issue, shortly after Ocalan was forced 
to leave his sanctuary in Syria. Several years later, he was promoting the idea of “politics 
beyond the state, political organization beyond the party, and political subjectivity beyond the 
class” (Akkaya and Jongerden 2015, 162). Moreover, Ocalan adopted a semi-anarchist tone in 
his prison writings and rejected the idea of founding a Kurdish nation-state, arguing that the 
State is “the ‘original sin’ of humanity” (Akkaya and Jongerden 2015, 171). In 2005, he penned 
down The Declaration of Democratic Confederalism, in which he drew a framework for a new 
politics of emancipation based on his prison readings and engaments (Öcalan 2005). This 
declaration has become a blueprint that guides the Kurdish movement in their struggle for 
democracy and atunomy since then. “The system of nation states”, Ocalan argues in the 
declaration, “has become a serious barrier to the development of society and democracy and 
freedom since the end of the 20th century” (Öcalan 2005, 1). What should one make of this 
transformation in Ocalan’s ideas, which are followed to their letter as goals by the dominant 
Kurdish political movement in Turkey? The PKK (hereafter will be referred, interchangeably, 
as the Kurdish political movement, Kurdish movement or Kurdish liberation movement) was 
founded to liberate Kurdistan and Kurds from foreign domination, although this was the first 
step in a socialist revolution in Turkey. What then, if not a Kurdish nation-state or a new State 
in Kurdistan, would achieve this? “The only alternative is democratic confederalism” declared 
Ocalan; referring to the model he developed “for the resolution of the problems of the Middle 
East” (Ibid.).  
This paper focuses on the project of Democratic Confederalism developed by the 
Kurdish political movement for the purpose of resolving the Kurdish issue and addressing the 
ongoing state of war in the Middle East.  
                                               
1  Dr Baris' current work is funded by the Leverhulme Trust and the University of Aberdeen, UK. This paper is based on a section in author’s 
PhD thesis titled “Beyond multiculturalism, away from state-oriented nationalism: self-rule through residential political communities in 
Kurdistan” (link). 
2  Original text: “Ankara’dan çıktık partileştik, Ortadoğu’ya çıktık ordulaştık, dünyaya açılarak devletleşeceğiz.” Ocalan was a student at 
Ankara University when he decided, together with several like-minded students, to leave Ankara for Kurdistan and start a revolutionary 
national liberation movement from there. They founded the party in 1978 in North Kurdistan (Southeast Turkey) and left Kurdistan for 
Lebanon to train in guerrilla warfare; thus, they formed a guerrilla army in the Middle East. The last step in this journey was founding a 
unified, socialist Kurdistan, a strategy that seems to have been abandoned. 
3  Abdullah Ocalan was ‘the Chairman’ (of the PKK) until that year, after which he gained an impersonal title called ‘the Leadership’, 
elevating him to an everlasting institution-like symbolic figure of the movement he led in person almost for three decades. Ocalan has 
been the ideological guru to and acquired the spiritual leadership of the dominant Kurdish political movements in Turkey and Syria since 
his imprisonment. He was also one of the parties in failed peace talks between the PKK and the Turkish government in 2009 and 2013. 
4  The PKK was founded as an armed political party in 1978 in Northern Kurdistan, with the aim of liberating Kurdistan from colonialism, 
exploitation and oppression of the Turkish, Iranian, Iraqi and Syrian states. The PKK remains as the core of a cluster of civic, political 
and military organizations that drive the Kurdistan liberation movement in Turkey plays a major role in Kurdish politics in Syria. In 
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The main argument is that the project is not based on existing models of minority 
rights or nation and state-building, but aspires to establish a new model of political community 
that challenges and undermines the existing hegemonic ones; i.e. the Islamic Ummah and the 
nation-state system. The project also indicates that the Kurdish political movement is not just 
a national liberation movement, but it also aspires to establish a trans-border and transnational 
political community that is based on ethics, not on national or cultural identity. The novelty of 
the model is that while the hegemonic models are based on ethnic, religious or national 
identities, the Kurdish movement appeals to democratic and civic principles and widely 
accepted standards such as autonomy, self-rule, individual and group rights, gender equality, 
social justice and ecology. The Kurdish model of political community emphasizes ethico-
political values more strongly than its rivals: 
Democratic modernity is the roof of an ethics-based political society. As long as we make the mistake 
to believe that societies need to be homogeneous monolithic entities it will be difficult to understand 
confederalism. Modernity’s history is also a history of four centuries of cultural and physical genocide 
in the name of an imaginary unitary society. Democratic confederalism as a sociological category is 
the counterpart of this history and it rests on the will to fight if necessary as well as on ethnic, cultural, 
and political diversity.                                                                                                   (Öcalan 2011, 24) 
Accordingly, the project of Democratic Confederalism aspires to establish ecology-
friendly, Aristotelian face to face political communities that are based on a stateless model of 
autonomous communes and their assemblies, town and city councils, and regional assemblies. 
The project envisages a gradually structured residential sovereignty nested in a confederal 
system that is designed to evolve into trans-border cooperation and coordination between the 
local and regional autonomous political entities. The model is proposed specifically for the 
solution of “the Kurdish Question” (a term I am not fond of using) in Turkey, Syria, Iran and 
Iraq, and for ending ethnic and religious conflicts in the Middle East in general. It undermines 
political principles and institutions that favour the existing nation-state system, such as 
exclusive membership, the exercise of political power through representation only, territorial 
state, and indivisible/absolute sovereignty.  
Two practical factors might be behind this transformation of the politics of the 
Kurdish movement: (I) the end of the Cold War, for it reduced the chance of support for left-
leaning national liberation movements from a superpower; and (II) the high human and 
economic costs of founding a nation-state for Kurds in a Kurdistan divided between four 
nation-states. However, these two factors do not explain such a radical ideological shift, 
although Ocalan is known for their pragmatism. The literature suggests that Ocalan’s 
individual engagement with contemporary political ideas from his prison cell have made the 
real change in his politics (Akkaya and Jongerden 2012a; 2012b; Biehl 2014; Enzinna 2015; 
In der Maur and Staal 2015). It led him to develop a different approach to the political, social 
and economic issues that deprive the Kurds of their freedom and plague the Middle East with 
ethic and religious violence5.  
                                               
5  Ocalan’s personal transformation was the outcome of his capture and imprisonment in 1999.  He maintained his importance and relevance 
to his party and his supporters, and familiarized himself with contemporary literature on post-Marxism, feminism, anarchism and radical 
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The human, ideological and organizational/structural elements that separates the 
Kurdish political movement from a typical nationalist movement have been extensively 
discussed and well-established in literature (TATORT Kurdistan 2011; 2014; Gunes and Gürer 
2018; Gunes 2020; Gunes and Yadirgi 2020; Gunes 2012; Akkaya and Jongerden 2015; 2013; 
2011; 2012c; Gunter 2015; Graeber 2014b; Matin 2019; Taussig 2015; Miley 2020). It should 
suffice to say that the model of political community that the movement tries to establish 
fundamentally differs from and clashes with the existing ones: namely, the Islamic Ummah, 
nationalism and neo-Ottomanism. The recent escalation of war between the current Turkish 
government and the PKK in Turkey, and the hostility of the Turkish government towards 
Syrian Kurdish autonomy is the clearest manifestations of this clash between competing 
Turkish and Kurdish visions of political community in the Middle East. “We will not allow the 
cantonization of Syria” sad the Turkish PM (Radikal, 04.12.2015), referring to the Kurdish 
cantons in Syrian Kurdistan; while his deputy stated that the peace talks that started between 
the PKK and the Turkish government in 2013 were abandoned because a new political project 
was implemented by the PKK affiliates in Syria (Radikal 08.10.2015).    
This brings us to three sets of questions. First, there is the issue of understanding the 
new, anti-statist agenda developed by Ocalan and adopted by the PKK and its affiliates. Why 
is Democratic Confederalism a better option in addressing the Kurdish issue than founding a 
nation-state for Kurds in Kurdistan? Why the Kurdish movement does not seek or demand 
territorial autonomy or a multicultural model of minority rights, instead of pursuing a more 
ambitious agenda of democratizing the Middle East? Second, we must analyse the impacts of 
this project on the relationships of the actors and the dynamics of the conflict/struggle in 
Kurdistan, Turkey and beyond. How does this project affect the praxis of the Kurdish political 
movement within and outside Turkey? How does the existing political establishment in Turkey 
react to this project? Are they relieved because the dominant Kurdish movement in Turkey and 
Syria no longer seek to establish their own state? Does this project help or hamper the 
communication or negotiation between the sides to the conflict in Turkey and Syria? Along 
with these empirical questions, there are also some theoretical issues to be explored. What 
changes does the project offer with regard to the existing political system in Turkey and in the 
Middle East? What does this project tell us about political community in general? What 
theoretical implications and contradictions with regard to political autonomy, self-
determination and sovereignty arise from this project?  
Therefore, the discussion in this paper revolves around three corresponding 
observations. First, the Middle East undergoes a crisis generated by competing visions of 
political community akin to the one at the beginning of the twentieth century. Both the Kurdish 
issue and the project of Democratic Confederalism should be analysed against this background. 
Second, the Kurdish political movement cannot be categorised as a typical nationalist 
movement.  
                                               
Democratic Nation and Democratic Republic, as a model for the solution of the Kurdish issue in the Middle East and as a project to 
transform the Middle East into a peaceful, ecology-friendly region for all, in which nation-states and borders eventually become obsolete. 
In less than a decade, all political institutions affiliated with the PKK all over Kurdistan went through a transformation and reorganization 
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Not only because it abandoned its initial goal of founding a Kurdish nation-state in 
Kurdistan (the homeland of the Kurds), but also because it challenges both practical 
manifestations of and theoretical justifications for the nation-state. Third, Kurdish politics in 
Turkey can no longer be placed within the framework of minority rights, because the Kurdish 
movement attempts to found an alternative political community to the nation-state. This 
amounts to the act of foundation, in Arendtian sense. This means that the movement acts like 
a constituting power. As a political subject that is engaged in the act of foundation, the 
movement builds a political community of its own, sets up its own institutions and procedures, 
relies on its power and resources in defending its gains, and attempts to gain control over 
natural resources, instead of simply demanding their rights to be respected by governments, 
hostile or friendly. Thus, analysing the movement’s politics through the lenses of ‘ethnic 
nationalism’ and/or minority rights would account to missing the big picture.   
The objective here is demonstrating that although the Kurdish political movement 
promotes and implements a politics of national liberation that is not centred on founding a 
nation-state, their politics is not compatible with a territorial autonomy granted by the State. 
This indicates that the movement is motivated by the will to power. This is clearly manifested 
in the ideology and practice of the political subjects that drive the movement. The movement 
does not act like a classical avant-garde nationalist or revolutionary party which aims at seizing 
state power; it pursues, although not exclusively, the goal of making itself the ultimate political 
authority that exercises political power in the name of democratically organized self-governing 
towns and cities in Kurdistan.     
 
2. The nihilist crisis in the Middle East and the three major visions of 
political community  
 
The violence, destruction, and nihilism that seem to never stop in the Middle East 
have been devastating the region. The ongoing turmoil bears uncanny resemblances to the crisis 
of political community formation in Europe in the nineteenth century. The crisis that was the 
outcome of the meltdown of transnationally shared values and goals (mostly rooted in religion), 
induced by modern dynamics such as political centralization, secularism, and nationalism 
around the turn of the twentieth century in Europe, now haunts the Middle East. Europe has 
(or maybe had), in Foucault’s words, settled “some of its violences” and managed to move 
from one “domination to [another kind of] domination” (Newman 2005, 42) via establishing 
the European Union. However, post-Ottoman societies are yet to resolve this crisis. Thus, a 
quick look at Nietzschean analysis of what would be awaiting Europe in the twentieth century 
will be useful here6.  
                                               
6  It goes without saying that the forces at play in these two regions with distinct histories and different human compositions are in no way 
identical or probably even comparable in many respects. The same goes for their self-appointed missions, aims and objectives, and the 
conditions under which they mobilize, perform and act. Still, there is a clear direction that the events flow through or towards. This is 
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The rise of nationalism and the ensuing discord in Europe during the nineteenth 
century was explained by Nietzsche through “the loss of a European voice” that deprived 
Europeans of the tools of cultivating “a common European spirit: Gradually the Christian ice 
was beginning to thaw, permitting the European continent to decompose into a set of rivalling 
and hostile nationalisms” (Elbe 2009, 75). Nietzsche contended that this was triggered by the 
advance of secularism, or the ‘death of God’ (Ibid.), which he thought unleashed a culture of 
‘nihilism’ that was about to take Europe captive. Nihilism meant “that the highest values 
devalue themselves”, and that “the aim was lacking”; because science and secularism had 
stripped Europe off of its Christian values that kept various peoples united (Ibid.). The 
replacement of that common aim, that uniting spirit, the argument goes, would not be possible 
in the short run. In the absence of a shared vision and after the erosion of common values, 
Europe would disintegrate into clashing and competing visions of political community; both at 
country and regional levels. Nietzsche’s fears turned into reality quickly after the turn of the 
century, as if he had stated a self-fulfilling prophecy. Secular ideologies such as nationalism, 
socialism and fascism transformed the imperial contest into a competition for (re)designing the 
world according to forms of political community based on racial hierarchies or mastery of 
ideologies. The rest is well-known: the destruction brought about by two major wars.  The 
(re)construction of a European community was only possible after the year 1989, through a 
series of agreements that gradually turned economic cooperation into political integration 
embodied by the European Union.7 
The Middle-East, “as a set of peoples and societies articulated not only by […] state 
structures but also by other ties, old and new, that cross or challenge borders” (Albo 1993, 19), 
was undergoing a process of discord in the turn of the twentieth century, akin to what Europe 
was experiencing. The dismantling effects of the advent of nationalism and the disenchantment 
of subject peoples of the Ottoman Empire with political reforms aimed at centralization during 
the nineteenth century incited wars of independence and resistance against imperial authorities. 
This did not only shrink the multinational Ottoman empire, but the ensuing appropriation of 
political authority and state institutions by nationalist elites, and the foundation and 
maintenance of oppressive nation-states backed by Western imperialism ushered in an era of 
‘nihilism’ that ravages the region ever since. The Middle East has been suffering a crisis of 
identity and purpose, triggered by the fading sense of a common history and the lack of a 
common vision among Muslim folks. This was crystalized in the discussions on how to prevent 
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, summarized in the well-known essay Uc Tarz-i Siyaset 
(literally “three modes of politics”, can be translated as Three Political Currents), written by 
the famous ideologue of Turkish nationalism Yusuf Akcura in 1904.8 He accurately and vividly 
                                               
could enable us to chart a map of analyses inferred from particular historical experiences of the nineteenth and twentieth century Europe. 
This might help us better understand the ongoing mayhem in the region and the direction it might take. 
7  This does not mean though, that the union is an ideal one, either for the West or for ‘the Rest’; especially now that the union is shaken by 
Brexit; rising nationalism, racism, xenophobia; economic crisis that had hit several countries harder than others; and harsh criticisms for 
its passive stand vis-à-vis and indifference to humanitarian disasters, chief among them the refugee crisis and the drowning migrants in 
the Mediterranean. 
8  The essay was published in the newspaper Turk in Cairo, because Akcura was a member of a secret military organization involved in 
conspiracies against the Ottoman Sultan. He left the country in order to avoid prosecution. He lived in France until 1903 and studied 
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captured the dominant schools of political thought within the Ottoman body politic of the time 
(translation by David S. Thomas):  
[S]ince the rise of the desires for progress and rehabilitation spread from the West, three principal 
political doctrines have been conceived and followed in the Ottoman dominions. The first is the one 
which seeks to create an Ottoman Nation through assimilating and unifying the various nations subject 
to Ottoman rule. The second seeks to unify politically all Muslims living under the governance of the 
Ottoman State because of the fact that the prerogative of the Caliphate has been a part of the power of 
the Ottoman State (this is what the Europeans call Pan-Islamism). The third seeks to organize a policy 
of Turkish nationalism (Turk Milliyet-i siyasiyesi) based on ethnicity. [N]on-Turkish Muslim groups 
who have been already Turkified to a certain extent would be further assimilated. Those who have 
never been assimilated but at the same time have no national feelings would be entirely assimilated 
under such a program.                                                                                               (Akçura 1904, 6, 12) 
After providing a detailed discussion on the “usefulness” and probable success or 
failure of these political doctrines, Akcura suggested, just as Nietzsche did in the case of 
‘Christian Europe’, that “in recent times, under the impact of Western ideas ethnic and national 
feelings which previously had been subsumed by Islam began to show their force” (1904, 11–
12).  He was convinced that neither creating an Ottoman nation, united in community sentiment 
and political identity, nor uniting all Muslims under the symbolic power of the Caliph were 
viable political projects. The project of founding an Ottoman nation was doomed because non-
Turkic peoples subjugated by the Ottoman rule “believed, they had experienced injustice and 
not justice, contempt and not equality, misery and not happiness. The Nineteenth century had 
taught them their past, their rights and their nationality on the one hand, and had weakened the 
Ottomans, their masters on the other” (Ibid. 8). The project of an Islamic political community 
would also fail, according to Akcura, because “The dominant current in our contemporary 
history is that of the nations. Religions as such are increasingly losing their political importance 
and force” (Ibid. 12). Thus, he concluded, the establishment of a political community based on 
Turkish ethnic nationalism (known as Turanism or Pan-Turkism) was the best way to prevent 
the collapse of the Ottoman state.  
These projects appear as competing models of political community in Akcura’s essay, 
although there is no equivalent term for ‘political community’ in Turkish. That is why the 
projects themselves do not appear as forms of political community, but they are only useful 
ideologies for preserving or capturing the seat of political authority, i.e. the State. What Akcura 
looks for is not uniting individuals and groups around shared values and common goals in order 
to establish a political community among equals. For him, the matter was following the most 
useful ideology that could prevent the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. This ideology was 
nationalism. Turkish nationalists, after seizing political power, should waste no time and 
engage in assimilating non-Turks in order for the nationalist project to succeed. In that sense, 
politics a la Akcura has been about discovering a useful ideology to obtain political power and 
maintain the status quo. There is no ultimate goal or ‘the greater good’ other than capturing 
state power. Indeed, Akcura asks, referring to Islamic, Ottoman, and Turkic interests: “are the 
interests of these three societies, which are political, religious, and ethnic, common?” (Ibid. 6). 
                                               
monarchy in 1908. He served the Turkish nationalist elite who seized power through a coup d’état in 1913 as a prominent ideologue of 
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Akcura suggests that the Turkish nationalist elite should mobilize masses and resources to 
create a sense of Turkishness, an exclusive Turkish identity politics, and create a Turkish 
polity, ideally unifying all Turkic groups in Asia and Europe. He is not interested in social 
justice or in creating a diverse political community on the basis of equality and rights.  
Each of the political currents discussed in Akcura’s work envisaged distinct political 
affinities and suggested loyalty to different political authorities. Ideally, these competing 
political projects within the Ottoman polity would settle the internal discord and deal with the 
prevailing nihilism through a confrontation between rival doctrines and their movements, 
which would result in the foundation of one or multiple political communities, depending on 
the project would ultimately manage to dominate others. This was what happened in Europe in 
the course of the twentieth century. Albeit, there is a difference in the context of the Middle 
East: political actors in the region have never been powerful enough to handle their own affairs 
without interference from global actors since the beginning of the nineteenth century.  
This does not mean that they had/have no agency. However, their agencies have not 
been the prevailing elements in the equation. Internal actors, forces and dynamics are not all to 
account for. The intervention of imperial European powers and the First World War disrupted 
the process of reshaping old political communities, founding new ones, and forming collective 
values in the entire Middle East. As Ulrichsen (2014) noted, major Western powers put a lid 
upon the working of socio-political dynamics within the region through invasions, agreements, 
military interventions and alliances before and after the First World War. This prevented 
Middle Eastern societies from shaping their own destiny and prolonged the enmities and 
conflicts in a way that best serves the interests of Western domination. External dynamics and 
powers still, to a great degree, design the politics in the region:      
It is thus no exaggeration to note that the First World War was pivotal to the creation of the modern 
Middle-East. It hastened the demise of the Ottoman Empire and paved the way for the emergence of a 
state-system (albeit under mandatory rule) that remains largely in place today. The entire political 
landscape of the region was reshaped as the legacy of the war sapped the ability of imperial ‘outsiders’ 
to dominate and influence events, and nationalist groups succeeded in mobilizing mass movements 
around distinctly national identities. New political movements and mass ideologies were intermixed 
with emergent debates around the identities and developmental trajectories of nation-states. […] it is 
harder to establish historical distance from events whose legacy continues to resonate throughout the 
region.                                                                                                                  (Ulrichsen 2014, 203–4) 
Likewise, Tankersley, referring to Thomas Piketty, has pointed out that “Inequality is 
a major driver of Middle Eastern terrorism, including the Islamic State attacks on Paris earlier 
this month — and Western nations have themselves largely to blame for that inequality”; 
because “[…] a small slice of people controls most of the wealth, while a large — including 
women and refugees — are kept in a state of ‘semi-slavery.’ Those economic conditions […] 
have become justifications for jihadists, along with the casualties of a series of wars in the 
region perpetuated by Western powers. ‘These are the regimes that are militarily and politically 
supported by Western powers […]. No wonder our lessons in social justice and democracy find 
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Consequently, not being able to resolve their own crisis of vision and identity and 
tackle the socio-political discords on their own, Middle Eastern societies are yet to end this 
nihilistic phase of their history (this – because nihilism, like other social phenomena, does not 
emerge or disappear once and far all; rather, it is always present, building up or spreading thin 
in cycles). Secular ideologies such as nationalism and socialism have been challenging the 
dominance of political Islam. Albeit none of them has been able to declare victory upon others, 
and the crisis is likely to be sustained until one of the century old visions or a new model of 
political community manages to establish its domination in the region. In Gramsci’s words, 
“The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in 
this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear. The old world is dying away, and 
the new world struggles to come forth: Now is the time of monsters” (Merip 2015, 6).  
Some analysts have argued that what we witness in the Middle-East is the equivalent 
of Thirty-Year’ War in the seventeenth century-Europe (Lawson 2014; MacMillan 2015); 
while others contended that the developments amount to the collapse of Sykes-Picot 
Agreement of 1916, after which the post-World War I state borders in the Middle-East were 
drawn by France and Britain (Gaub and Pawlak 2013; Rabinovich 2014). Hardt and Negri too, 
refer to civil wars as a global problem and they are convinced that “The theory and practices 
of modern sovereignty were born by confronting this same problem, the problem of civil war-
and here we are thrown back primarily to the seventeenth rather than the eighteenth century” 
(2004, 238). MERIP editors have succinctly summarised the ills of the contemporary Middle-
East as “the frustration of participatory politics, the fixation upon state security at the expense 
of freedoms, the stubborn growth of inequality amidst great wealth, the lack of investment in 
education and other public goods, all in the shadow of outside interference and, now, imminent 
destruction” (2015, 6). What makes the problem worse is that none of the long-held grand-
visions of political community, i.e. nationalism, pan-Islamism and (neo)Ottomanism seems to 
be promising.  
The problem with Islamic political community, the Ummah, as Cundioglu pointed out, 
is that Islam has lost its universal voice especially in the Middle-East; it does not address its 
audience as “humanity” anymore, but sees them as “the faithful” (Oskay 2015). Thus, it is no 
longer able to bind the Kurds, Turks, and Arabs together even in the Sunni camp of the religion, 
let alone uniting all the sects under one umbrella. Islam has thus ceased to be a solution to the 
ongoing state of war in the Middle East. It is now part of the problem. Besides, Islam is not a 
goal even for the neo-Islamic or Pan-Islamic tendency in Turkish politics anymore. As Ozkan 
notes: 
The neo-Ottomanist label that is frequently attributed to Davutoglu [Turkish PM of the time] is 
misleading. He criticizes neo-Ottomanism in his articles for being too Western-oriented. Davutoglu is 
a pan-Islamist. He is deeply influenced by Islam, yet he also uses Islam to achieve his foreign policy 
goals. He believes in a Sunni Muslim hegemonic order led by Turkey that would encompass the Middle 
East, the Caucasus and Central Asia, and include Albania and Bosnia as well. And I say Sunni because 
Iran is not part of this envisaged world. He argues that Turkey cannot be confined to its present-day 
borders. Should it continue to cling to its post-Cold War policy of preserving the status quo, Turkey 
will be destroyed. He believes that the nation-states that were formed in 1918 were artificial. But he 
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go back in time to an order based on Islamic unity, on which Turkey expands its power not through 
military power but by creating spheres of influence. But this is a fantasy that has no academic basis. 
                                                                                                                                         (Ozkan 2014, 2) 
The reason behind Islam’s loss of its universal voice is the very problem with another 
vision of political community: nationalism. Like Islam, nationalism, too, has become a means 
to ends for the political elite who utilize it to seize state power or to obtain political gains. 
Therefore, it has no quality to be a uniting civic force that bonds individuals and groups from 
different cultural, national or religious backgrounds in nation-states in the region.  
Nation-states have mostly relied on oppressive, repressive and assimilationist policies 
to achieve or preserve unity among their citizens, and thus marginalized and persecuted either 
minorities or majorities under their rule. National ideologies in the region have no moral or 
ethical force left in their articulations, even rhetorically, to advocate for shared values and 
common goals. It is also not possible to match the borders of states with the exact boundaries 
of the people that supposedly belong to their nation, because no matter how one draws borders, 
there will always be a minority of this or that kind within the borders of a given state. Indeed, 
nationalism has been the problem itself since the very beginning of this crisis, causing 
genocides, ethnic cleansings and massacres almost every decade in the region. That is why it 
offers no viable solution to the ongoing crisis in the Middle East.  
Lastly, Turkey’s current government has been associated with pursuing a dream of 
neo-Ottomanism. This ideology or political vision did not stick even in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, as Akcura (1904) pointed out a century ago. However, although neo-
Ottomanism has played role in the electoral success of the current governing party in Turkey 
due to its positive image in the Turkish and Kurdish conservatives’ collective memory, it is not 
high on the agenda of any major political actor as a uniting force in the Middle East. It appears 
rather as a tool of domination, utilized to legitimize the current Turkish government claims and 
agendas. Thus, the third grand-vision of political community is also not an option.   
 
3. Democratic Confederalism: the Kurdish vision of political community as 
the fourth contender in the Middle East 
 
Our foundations aren’t the state’s laws but civil disobedience and 
the universal human rights. We know that the state won’t just hand 
us the democratic rights. So, our basis is not the rulers and their 
institutions, but democratic society and nature. We organize 
communes in the villages, and councils in the cities, and in that way 
try to organize democratic self-management. 
              A DTK9 member, quoted in TATORT Kurdistan (2011, 28) 
                                               
9  Founded in 2005, in the city of Diyarbakir (Amed in Kurdish), Turkey, Demokratik Toplum Kongresi/Democratic Society Congress is 
an umbrella organization that brings together more than a thousand delegates from civil society organizations, political parties, 
municipalities and de facto city councils in Kurdistan of Turkey. The organization functions as a mechanism of democratising politics 
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Here is where the project of Democratic Confederalism assumes relevance. 
Marginalized and persecuted by hegemonic systems of political community in the Middle East, 
the Kurdish movement has developed a model that is in direct confrontation with the old, major 
ones. A careful examination of primary and secondary sources on the ideology and praxis of 
the Kurdish political movement will reveal that liberating Kurdistan or obtaining group-
specific rights for the Kurds have been only part of a larger scheme and a more ambitious 
programme pursued by the movement. For instance, Ocalan emphasizes that “The PKK never 
regarded the Kurdish question as a mere problem of ethnicity or nationhood. Rather, we 
believed, it was the project of liberating the [whole Turkish] society and democratizing it” 
(2011, 7). The movement’s human composition and its ideology testify to this fact (Gunes 
2012; Jongerden and Akkaya 2011; Akkaya and Jongerden 2012a; 2012b). Also, the 
movement’s goals, aspirations, and actions serve a much more radical and transformative 
agenda than that of a typical national liberation movement (Öcalan 2005; 2011; TATORT 
Kurdistan 2011; Matin 2015; Akkaya and Jongerden 2015). 
Developed by the Kurdish political movement’s founder Ocalan, who drew mainly on 
ecologist, post-Marxist, postmodernist, anarchist and environmentalist political theorists (chief 
among them is the American political theorist Murray Bookchin), this project emerges as the 
fourth vision of political community that claims to have what it takes to ‘fix’ the Middle-East.10 
Focusing particularly on the destructive effects of nationalism and the oppressive 
characteristics of nation-states in the Middle East, and also emphasizing the more general 
issues about nation-states such as their class formation, their role in promoting individualism 
and capitalist modernity that are associated with environmental degradation, ecological 
destruction and subjugation of communities to centralized states, Ocalan is convinced that  
[T]he foundation of a separate Kurdish nation-state does not make sense for the Kurds. Over the last 
decades the Kurds have not only struggled against repression by the dominant powers and for the 
recognition of their existence but also for the liberation of their society from the grip of feudalism. 
Hence it does not make sense to replace the old chains by new ones or even enhance the repression. 
This is what the foundation of a nation-state would mean in the context of the capitalist modernity. 
Without opposition against the capitalist modernity there will be no place for the liberation of the 
peoples. This is why the founding of a Kurdish nation-state is not an option for me. The call for a 
separate nation-state results from the interests of the ruling class or the interests of the bourgeoisie but 
does not reflect the interests of the people since another state would only be the creation of additional 
injustice and would curtail the right to freedom even more. The solution to the Kurdish question, 
therefore, needs to be found in an approach that weakens the capitalist modernity or pushes it back. 
                                                                                                                                      (Öcalan 2011, 19) 
                                               
10  Analysts, especially the Kurdish intelligentsia, see the Kurdish bid to come up with a project of their own in order to offer an alternative 
in the form of a radical democratic model, as a welcome development in the Middle East that should be supported (for a webinar in which 
the Kurdish alternative vision of political community is put in perspective within this framework by academics and political activists see 
Kurds and Democracy: in Conversation with Saleh Moslem, in Muslim 2020). Because, after all, a project that ‘solves’ the Kurdish issue 
potentially brings peace to the Middle-East as well; since the Kurds live in four nation-states (Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria) that have been 
the sources of much of instability in the region. Two of these states (Turkey and Iran) are regional powers who have been competing for 
prominence since the sixteenth century, and they use their ‘Kurdish cards’ very often to gain the upper hand in regional and global power-
politics. Besides, with its almost 40 million population and rich oil and water resources, Kurdistan is one of the most important dynamics 
in the region, although not ‘yet’ one of the collective subjects. Thus, it is important what Kurdish actors do and whom they befriend in 
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Ocalan suggests that “a system which takes into consideration the religious, ethnic and 
class differences in society” should be promoted (2005, 1). “For Kurdistan”, he argues, his 
system does not “interpret the right to self determination to establish a nation state, but develops 
its own democracy in spite of political boundaries” (Ibid.). The project necessitates that 
Kurdish activists, politicians and organizations build grassroots democratic institutions within 
each part of Kurdistan, such as communes, councils, popular assemblies, regional assemblies; 
youth, women, economic and ecological councils, and then bridge them together to create a 
bond that reaches beyond national boundaries:  
Within Kurdistan democratic confederalism will establish village, towns and city assemblies and their 
delegates will be entrusted with the real decision-making, which in effect means that the people and 
the community will decide. Democratic confederalism of Kurdistan is not a state system, but a 
democratic system of the people without a state. With the women and youth at the forefront, it is a 
system in which all sectors of society will develop their own democratic organisations. It is a politics 
exercised by free and equal confederal citizens by electing their own free regional representatives. 
                                                                                                                                        (Öcalan 2005, 1) 
Ocalan suggests that political actors in Kurdistan and in the greater Middle East should 
not wait for the nation-states to accept the demands for democratization and social justice put 
forward by citizens. They should take the necessary steps for liberating Kurdistan and creating 
a peaceful Middle East on their own, relying on their agency and power. This is what Mouffe 
(1989) and Jongerden (2015) refer to as radical democracy or radicalising democracy: 
expanding political space beyond legal and formal institutions, forming grassroots forums, 
councils and assemblies open to universal participation of residents (not only citizens), building 
coalitions among different sections and sectors of society, and practicing democracy through a 
culture of solidarity without being authorized by the State. These tactics and strategies have all 
been implemented in Northern and Western Kurdistan (Turkey and Syria) more powerfully 
than in other parts of Kurdistan.  
Although the project has been developed by the Kurdish political movement originated 
in Northern Kurdistan (Kurdistana Bakûr in Kurdish, Southeast Turkey), and although it was 
partially implemented there in some towns and cities through building communes, councils 
and assemblies and declaring autonomy (TATORT Kurdistan 2011), it is in the process of 
being ‘fully’ realized in Rojava, i.e. Western/Syrian Kurdistan, through the ongoing radical 
democratic experiment and social revolution (TATORT Kurdistan 2014; Haenni and Quesnay 
2020; Hunt 2019; Rojava Information Center 2019; Aretaios 2015; Knapp and Jongerden 2014; 
Tax 2016; Gupta 2017; Knapp, Flach, and Ayboğa 2016; Leo 2018; Allsopp and Wilgenburg 
2019). Therefore, referring to his impression of the implementation of the model in Rojava, 
Taussig emphasizes that he was “overwhelmed by the strangeness of it all; by the openness of 
people, their crazy generosity, and the splendor of their cause, a first in the Middle East if not 
in world history”, (2015, 3). David Graeber (2014a; 2014b) presented similar remarks about 
Rojava and the implementation of radical democratic politics there. Many academics and 
commentators in Turkey have hailed the revolution in Rojava and named the experiment as “a 
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Miley argues that “the HDP and the Ocalan model of democratic confederalism remain 
the country’s [Turkey’s), and the region’s, greatest hope for peace” (2015, 1). Hence, it seems 
that Democratic Confederalism has already left its mark on politics; specifically in the Kurdish 
regions of Turkey and Syria, as a new model of political community that challenges the 
hegemony of political Islam and the nation-state.  
There is but one problem with this optimism: the PKK, the developer and promoter of 
this project is still criminalized in Turkey, Syria and Iran, and it is on the list of ‘terrorist’ 
organizations in the EU and the US. It is looked upon with suspicion even by a good deal of 
religious/conservative Kurds. This means that the Kurds are on their own in promoting, 
establishing, maintaining and protecting their vision of political community. In other words, 
founding the kind of political community envisaged in the project of Democratic 
Confederalism will require “the act of foundation” a la Arendt (1963, 125–235), because unless 
the act of foundation is carried out, there will be no alternative political community to speak 




I tried to contextualise the model of Democratic Confederalism. I argued that since the 
Kurdish political movement was “born from the left” (Jongerden and Akkaya 2011) in Turkey, 
it did not limit itself with promoting Kurdish rights, but pursued a greater agenda of revolution 
and democratization of Turkey and the Middle-East. Thus, the project they developed is not 
only a model for the recognition of Kurdish national rights, autonomy or self-government, but 
an ambitious and comprehensive model of political community that is designed to tackle 
political domination, social inequality, economic exploitation, gender inequality, 
environmental degradation and other ethical concerns.  
Drawing on Akcura’s (1904) work, which is known as the essay that ‘started 
everything’ when it comes to discussions on clashing visions of political community in the 
Middle East, I argued that the Kurdish political movement tries to implement its project in 
order to expand its sphere of influence, and hence, it gets into direct confrontation with the 
existing political establishment in Turkey in particular and in the Middle East in general. 
Additionally, since the Kurdish political movement tries to realise its program without 
authorization from nation-states, their agenda and praxis is not tolerated by established orders 
and confronted violently in the region. Their program is perceived as a threat to the national 
security of the states involved. Here, Mouffe’s (1989) formulation of radical democracy, Hardt 
and Negri’s (2004) critical approach to representation and sovereignty and their notion of 
multitude as the political subject, Bookchin’s (2015) theory of libertarian municipalism that 
suggest founding city states instead of seizing state power should be identified as theoretical 
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Lastly, I also argued that notwithstanding how a political authority legitimises its 
exercise of power, it is ultimately the act of foundation and the founding authority that 
determines the kind and characteristics of a political community, and not the other way around.  
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